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View Full Version : Gross Mismanagement Blamed 4 100's Of Marines' Dea



Gayle in MD
02-16-2008, 11:00 AM
<font color="red">I don't think Bill Clinton was around when our soldiers began to face the devastating results of IED's in Iarq. Unless he could have seen into the future results of a madman in the W.H. whose appointed Secretary Of Defense took the position that HE, not the Military, would run this war, and it would be prosecuted according to HIS having fallen in love with His own impractical War Plan, of Few and Lightwith any dissenters axed for their opposition to His Plan. That we have enough ranking Military leaders, who prefer to vie for extra stars on their shoulders, and hence higher retirement pay, in leiu of protecting our soldiers, is greatly distressing. They failed to speak out for our soldiers, and instead, laid down for this civilian operated, FUBAR, which was thrusted upon our soldiers by Donald Rumsfeld, compliments of the Commander &amp; Chief. The buck stops on his desk, not with Bill Clinton. </font color>

Iraq roadside bombs, Marine Corps, us casualties, warwire
Bureaucrats' "Gross Mismanagement" Blamed For Hundreds Of Marines' Deaths
RICHARD LARDNER | February 16, 2008 07:28 AM EST |




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WASHINGTON Hundreds of U.S. Marines have been killed or injured by roadside bombs in Iraq because Marine Corps bureaucrats refused an urgent request in 2005 from battlefield commanders for blast-resistant vehicles, an internal military study concludes. <font color="red">Urgent, after years of Rumsfeld ignoring it, and Democrats begging for everything from helmets to armor for our soldiers, read John Murtha, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, and numerous retired Generals. </font color>

The study, written by a civilian Marine Corps official and obtained by The Associated Press, accuses the service of "gross mismanagement" that delayed deliveries of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected trucks for more than two years. <font color="red">More than two years? Didn't we invade in 03? </font color>

Cost was a driving factor in the decision to turn down the request for the so-called MRAPs, according to the study. Stateside authorities saw the hulking vehicles, which can cost as much as a $1 million each, as a financial threat to programs aimed at developing lighter vehicles that were years from being fielded. <font color="red">And not sufficient, but I'm sure the no bid contracts had already been agreed to in the smoke filled back rooms of this corporate fascist regime. </font color>

After Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared the MRAP (pronounced M-rap) the Pentagon's No. 1 acquisition priority in May 2007, the trucks began to be shipped to Iraq in large quantities. <font color="red">Gee, when was Rumsfeld axed? Nov. or Dec. 06? </font color>

The vehicles weigh as much as 40 tons and have been effective at protecting American forces from improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the weapon of choice for Iraqi insurgents. Only four U.S. troops have been killed by such bombs while riding in MRAPs; three of those deaths occurred in older versions of the vehicles.

The study's author, Franz J. Gayl, catalogs what he says were flawed decisions and missteps by midlevel managers in Marine Corps offices that occurred well before Gates replaced Donald Rumsfeld in December 2006.
<font color="red">rumsfeld..."You don't go to war with the Army you want, you go with the Army you have." Particularly when you need to get there before anyone learns there is no actual proven, pressing reason to go in the first place. </font color>

Among the findings in the Jan. 22 study:

_ Budget and procurement managers failed to recognize the damage being done by IEDs in late 2004 and early 2005 and were convinced the best solution was adding more armor to the less-sturdy Humvees the Marines were using. <font color="red">Failed? I don't think so, we all knew, even way back then that our soldiers were looking for scraps of metal in the trash. John Murtha, and other Democrats were screaming about it on the Senate floor non stop. Republicans were blocking every request for investigations. Bush was crying for the cameras in front of hollywood styled back drops over our troops, and their Sacrifice. </font color> Humvees, even those with extra layers of steel, <font color="red">like soda cans from the trash? </font color> proved incapable of blunting the increasingly powerful explosives planted by insurgents. <font color="red"> yes, I recall reading about that long, long ago. </font color>

_ An urgent February 2005 request for MRAPs got lost in bureaucracy. <font color="red">Lost? How do urgent requests get lost? Rummy tore it up? </font color> It was signed by then-Brig. Gen. Dennis Hejlik, who asked for 1,169 of the vehicles. The Marines could not continue to take "serious and grave casualties" caused by IEDs when a solution was commercially available, wrote Hejlik, who was a commander in western Iraq from June 2004 to February 2005. <font color="red">Gee, who was in charge of staying abreast of what our soldiers needed? Wasn't Pace around then? Or was it Franks, two years earlier? Or how about all the Bush and Rummy stated BS about how they were listening to the Commanders on the ground? </font color>

Gayl cites documents showing Hejlik's request was shuttled to a civilian logistics official at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in suburban Washington who had little experience with military vehicles. <font color="red">But then, he WAS right in Washington. Like Walter Reed WAS right across the street fro the General, and the White HOuse WAS only six miles away from W.R. </font color> As a result, there was more concern over how the MRAP would upset the Marine Corps' supply and maintenance chains than there was in getting the troops a truck that would keep them alive, the study contends. <font color="red">And the no bid contracts? </font color>

_ The Marine Corps' acquisition staff didn't give top leaders correct information. Gen. James Conway, the Marine Corps commandant, was not told of the gravity of Hejlik's MRAP request and the real reasons it was shelved, Gayl writes. That resulted in Conway giving "inaccurate and incomplete" information to Congress about why buying MRAPs was not hotly pursued. <font color="red">Who do they think they're fooling? Same ol' same ol', 'they didn't give us the right info, it's all grunts fault' gee , guess they didn't keep up with the constant news about how many sooldiers were being killed every day by IED's, roadside bombs. Hey, isn't that what they said about the WMD's, too? Those "they's" at the top sure are in the dark most of the time, poor babies. Ya think maybe they don't listen, or dig deep enough to find out how our soldiers are doing, or already have a policy that ignores the experts? Sort of like the General who lived right across the street from the cess pool our soldiers were living in at Walter Reed? Maybe they felt just like our intelligence people, that no body from this administration was going to listen to anything that didn't fit their pre-conceived plan. </font color>

_ The Combat Development Command, which decides what gear to buy, treated the MRAP as an expensive obstacle to long-range plans for equipment that was more mobile and fit into the Marines Corps' vision as a rapid reaction force. Those projects included a Humvee replacement called the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and a new vehicle for reconnaissance and surveillance missions. <font color="red">And the no bid was already settled. Rummy said, light and fast, and refused to liten to anything else. </font color>

The MRAPs didn't meet this fast-moving standard and so the Combat Development Command didn't want to buy them, according to Gayl. The study calls this approach a "Cold War orientation" that suffocates the ability to react to emergency situations. <font color="red">Oh hell yeah, why pay any attention to lessons learned from the old days. </font color>

_ The Combat Development Command has managers _ some of whom are retired Marines _ who lack adequate technical credentials. They have outdated views of what works on the battlefield and how the defense industry operates, Gayl says. Yet they are in position to ignore or overrule calls from deployed commanders. <font color="red">Yeah, right, it take a rocket scientist to draw a line with a crayon, from daily counts of how many soldiers were dying every day, being blown up in roadside bombs. Oh wait a minute, wasn't that the overall policy, of the secretary of Defense, and the president, overrule everyone who slows us up, and first off, get rid of Powell. How dare he question our intelligence manufacturing. How dare he disagree, put him on our illegal wire taps. He's a dissident. </font color>

An inquiry should be conducted by the Marine Corps inspector general to determine if any military or government employees are culpable for failing to rush critical gear to the troops, recommends Gayl, who prepared the study for the Marine Corps' plans, policies and operations department.

The study was obtained by the AP from a nongovernment source.

"If the mass procurement and fielding of MRAPs had begun in 2005 in response to the known and acknowledged threats at that time, as the (Marine Corps) is doing today, hundreds of deaths and injuries could have been prevented," writes Gayl, the science and technology adviser to Lt. Gen. Richard Natonski, who heads the department. "While the possibility of individual corruption remains undetermined, <font color="red">Undeterimined, isn't that repub speak for hidden? </font color> the existence of corrupted MRAP processes is likely, and worthy of (inspector general) investigation." <font color="red">There were no oversight investigations into any of this until Democrats won in 06. </font color>

Gayl, who has clashed with his superiors in the past and filed for whistle-blower protection last year, uses official Marine Corps documents, e-mails, briefing charts, memos, congressional testimony, and news articles to make his case.

He was not allowed to interview or correspond with any employees connected to the Combat Development Command. The study's cover page says the views in the study are his own.

Maj. Manuel Delarosa, a Marine Corps spokesman, called Gayl's study "predecisional staff work" and said it would be inappropriate to comment on it. Delarosa said, "It would be inaccurate to state that Lt. Gen. Natonski has seen or is even aware of" the study. <font color="red">Gee, we sure as hell don't want to cloud war decisions up with any pre-decisional decisions that might slow down the decider, et al. </font color>

Last year, the service defended the decision to not buy MRAPs after receiving the 2005 request. There were too few companies able to make the vehicles, and armored Humvees were adequate, officials said then. <font color="red">Yeah, right, just like Halliburton was the only company that could handle provisions in Iraq. /ccboard/images/graemlins/smirk.gif </font color>

Hejlik, who is now a major general and heads Marine Corps Special Operations Command, has cast his 2005 statement as more of a recommendation than a demand for a specific system. <font color="red">Oh yeah, lets not make any demands that would protect our troops. Nothing urgent about brain dead, and quadrapedic future veterans. </font color>

The term mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle "was very generic" and intended to guide a broader discussion of what type of truck would be needed to defend against the changing threats troops in the field faced, Hejlik told reporters in May 2007. <font color="red">Oh, so Clinton didn't have the powers of Nancy Reagan's Astrologer? What a dummy! </font color> "I don't think there was any intent by anybody to do anything but the right thing." /ccboard/images/graemlins/smirk.gif

The study does not say precisely how many Marine casualties Gayl thinks occurred due to the lack of MRAPs, which have V-shaped hulls that deflect blasts out and away from the vehicles. <font color="red">Well who didn't know that? No one knows how many Iraqis have been killed, What this war is actually costing, or where all the missing e-mails are, either. Damned, it's been a strange sort of Twilight Zone administrations, hasn't it? People vanishing and showing up imprisoned, without habeas corpus, strange bundling and data mined info, behind secret closed doors, terrorist attacks prevented, but no one know who or how? </font color>

Gayl cites a March 1, 2007, memo from Conway to Gen. Peter Pace, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which Conway said 150 service members were killed and an additional 1,500 were seriously injured in the prior nine months by IEDs while traveling in vehicles. <font color="red">That's right, folks, Pace, the puppet of the Bush administration who took Frank's place, maybe he thought they were all gay. </font color>

The MRAP, Conway told Pace, could reduce IED casualties in vehicles by 80 percent. <font color="red">That's 80%, friends, what does that translate into in arms, legs, brains, and corpses? </font color> He told Pace an urgent request for the vehicles was submitted by a Marine commander in May 2006. No mention is made of Hejlik's call more than a year before.
<font color="red">Gee, wonder why? </font color>
Delivering MRAPs to Marines in Iraq, Conway wrote, was his "number one unfilled warfighting requirement at this time." <font color="red">And should have been for the last five years. </font color> Overall, he added, the Marine Corps needed 3,700 of the trucks _ more than three times the number requested by Hejlik in 2005. <font color="red">Now that we've escalated the slaughter in Iraq, and the Iraqis need them now. </font color>

More than 3,200 U.S. troops, including 824 Marines, have been killed in action in Iraq since the war began in March 2003. An additional 29,000 have been wounded, nearly 8,400 of them Marines. The majority of the deaths and injuries have been caused by explosive devices, according to the Defense Department. <font color="red"> /ccboard/images/graemlins/mad.gif </font color>

Congress has provided more than $22 billion for 15,000 MRAPs the Defense Department plans to acquire, mostly for the Army. <font color="red">that's the Democratic Congres, to be exact, after the Republican Congress blocked the investigations into any of this, and refused to impliment oversight investigations. Democrats have held investigations, and added money to the budget, oh, did Bush threaten to veto those extra provisions? Damned Democratic earmarks! </font color> Depending on the size of the vehicle and how it is equipped, the trucks can cost between $450,000 and $1 million. <font color="red">Hmmm, how much have we spent on the Embassy Castle so far, and/or mysteriously lost, by the multiple billions? </font color>

As of May 2007, roughly 120 MRAPs were being used by troops from all the military services, Pentagon records show. Now, more than 2,150 are in the hands of personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Marines have 900 of those.

One section of Gayl's study analyzes a letter Conway sent in late July 2007 to Sens. Joseph Biden, D-Del., and Kit Bond, R-Mo., two critics of delays in sending equipment to Iraq.

More heavily armored Humvees were determined to be the best response to the 2005 MRAP request, the commandant told the senators. He also said the industrial capacity to build MRAPs in large numbers "did not exist" when the request was submitted. Additionally, although the trucks had been fielded in small numbers, they were not adequately tested and exhibited reliability problems, <font color="red">The few that were in Iraq, were certainly the choice of the soldiers. </font color> the letter said.

The letter to the senators is evidence of the "bad advice" senior Marine Corps leaders receive, Gayl contends. The letter, he says, portions of which were probably drafted by the Combat Development Command, omitted that the urgent 2005 request from the Iraq battlefield specifically asked for MRAPs _ and not more heavily armored Humvees. It also ignored the Marines' own findings that armored Humvees wouldn't stop IEDs. <font color="red">I guess we can figure that out, or atleast those of us who can draw a straight line, or read between the lines. </font color>

Conway's assertion there was a lack of manufacturing capacity to build MRAPs is "inexplicable," Gayl says. Manufacturers would have hurried production if they knew the Marines wanted them and any reliability issues would have been resolved, he says. <font color="red">Everything that's happen since Bush crashed into the White House is inexplicable. They can't talk about any of it, it's all under investigation, or tied up in the courts, or classified. </font color>

In late November, the Marine Corps announced it would buy 2,300 MRAPs _ 1,400 fewer than planned. Improved security in Iraq, changes in tactics, and decreasing troop levels allowed for the cut. <font color="red">What decreasing troop levels? Aren't they backing off that lately? buth that's ok, atleast the Iraqi parliament will have breathing room to screw off for another year. </font color> But Marine officials also listed several downsides to the MRAP: The vehicles are too tall and heavy to pursue the enemy down narrow streets, on rough terrain or across many bridges. <font color="red">Then make some of them smaller. </font color>

If MRAPs arrived to Iraq late, or proved too bulky for certain missions, the Marine Corps should have come up with different and better solutions several years ago when the IED crisis was growing, Gayl contends. <font color="red">
They're still being blown up every week. </font color>

A former Marine officer, Gayl spent nearly six months in Iraq in 2006 and 2007 as an adviser to leaders of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force.

His stinging indictment of the Marine Corps' system for fielding gear is not a first. He has been an outspoken advocate for non-lethal weapons, such as a beam gun that stings but doesn't kill and "dazzlers" that use a powerful light beam to steer unwelcome vehicles and people from checkpoints and convoys.

The failure to send these alternative weapons to Iraq has led to U.S. casualties and the deaths of Iraqi civilians, Gayl has said.

Gayl filed for whistle-blower protection in May with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel. He said he was threatened with disciplinary action after meeting with congressional staff on Capitol Hill.

Biden and Bond rebuked the Marine Corps in September for "apparent retaliation" against Gayl.

<font color="red">Gee, and all this time I thought it was all Clinton's fault! /ccboard/images/graemlins/smirk.gif </font color>

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Associated Press researcher Monika Mathur contributed to this report from New York.

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On The Net: http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/homepage?readform